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The Farm Credit System is a major participant in extending credit to and bro-
kering losses from the agricultural sector during the current adjustment process. 
This article focuses on the problems faced by the system as a cooperative lender 
with relatively little diversity in its loan portfolio. Assistance to the system should 
be accompanied by organizational and structural changes that address the fun-
damental reasons for its vulnerability. Conditions suggest three basic choices: ( l) 
preservation of the system in recognizable form, (2) decentralization to the district 
level, or (3) a shift toward a wholesaling function. One realistic alternative would 
involve a combination of these approaches. 
The nature of the debt crisis in agriculture, one of the two major prob-
lems facing the sector (Harl 1986b), ensures that the near-term financial 
travail cannot be solved by farm commodity programs alone, even if price 
support programs are continued at present levels. Additional programs, 
on a targeted basis, will be necessary if agriculture is to be made stable in 
the near term. Relative stability for agriculture slows the adjustment pro-
cess to levels at which land and machinery transfers can be realistically 
absorbed by the markets. Time and income buoyancy are needed for the 
necessary debt and asset adjustment to be carried out in a rational manner. 
The Farm Credit System, as a cooperative lender, is a major participant 
in the delicate but vital process of extending credit to and brokering losses 
from the agricultural sector enduring this massive adjustment process. 
This article focuses attention on the problems faced by the Farm Credit 
System as a cooperative lender with relatively little diversity in its loan 
portfolio. 
Scope of the Problem 
Fundamental to an understanding of the farm debt phenomenon is that 
it is a systems problem, not merely a problem of borrower instability. The 
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problem is one oflender instability, vendor instability, and even instability 
of rural communities (see U.S. Congress; U.S. Department of Agriculture 
1986b). Thus the proper characterization of the sector in the 1980s has 
been one of substantial economic stress. For the Farm Credit System, the 
relevant challenges are: ( 1) near-term survival and (2) longer-term restruc-
turing to reduce the risk of system difficulty during the next period of 
comparable economic stress. 
The data make it abundantly clear that enough assets and debt are held 
by farmers who are unstable economically to ensure that further weakness 
in land and machinery values (below 1987 levels) may occur if: (1) farm 
incomes fall significantly, (2) real interest rates for agricultural lending 
rise significantly, or (3) major public sector intervention efforts are not 
implemented to stabilize the agricultural sector. 
The impact of debtor distress on lenders has been substantial. In 1985, 
the Farm Credit System incurred a $2.7 billion loss, the largest one-year 
loss of any U.S. financial institution. The loss in 1986 was $1.9 billion. A 
total of 68 agricultural banks failed in 1986, out of a total of 138 failed 
banks. The concentration of debt among the most heavily indebted farmers 
indicates further deterioration of financial condition of lenders is likely. 
As shown in table 1, a total of almost $38 billion of debt is held by farm 
operators with debt-to-asset ratios above 70 percent. For operators with 
debt-to-asset ratios above 40 percent, the figure is more than $75 billion 
(U.S. Department of Agriculture 1986b, table 10). 
• Commercial banks hold about 27 percent of operator debt (table 2), 
but almost 61 percent of those loans are held by operators above a 40 
percent debt-to-asset ratio. Just under 14 percent of their debt is owed 
by insolvent farmers (those with debt-to-asset ratios over 100 percent). 
Table 1.-Debt Owed by Farm Operators, January 1, 1986 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
Lender 0-40% 41-70% 71-100% Over 100% Total 
Million Dollars 
Commercial Banks 12.007 10,508 4,284 4,263 31,062 
Federal Land Banks 8,164 8.936 5,380 2,663 25,142 
Farmers Home Administration 2,626 4,833 3,538 6,035 17,082 
Production Credit Associations 3,704 2,951 1,116 1,037 8,807 
Commodity Credit Corporation 2,652 2,988 1,467 1,146 8,253 
Merchants and Dealers 766 446 317 330 1,860 
Other Farmers 386 258 410 364 1.419 
Other Individuals 5,042 3,950 2,092 1.544 12,628 
Others 2,847 2,378 1,089 823 7,136 
All Farms 38,195 37.248 19,692 18,205 113,389• 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 1986b, table 10, p. 22. 
aThis figure is about $92 billion less than published in the U.S. Department of Agriculture farm sector balance sheet. 
with about $39 billion in "unexplained differences" (pp. 31-33). 
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Table 2.-Distribution of Debt Owed by Farm Operators, January 1, 
1986 
Lender 
Commercial Banks 
Federal Land Banks 
Farmers Home Administration 
Production Credit Associations 
Commodity Credit Corporation 
Merchants and Dealers 
Others Farmers 
Other Individuals 
Others 
Source: Computed from table 1. 
Share of 
Total 
Operator 
Loans 
27 
22 
15 
8 
7 
2 
1 
11 
6 
Share of 
Loan Portfolio 
Owed by 
Operators 
With Debt-to-
Asset 
Ratios Over 40% 
Percent 
61 
68 
84 
58 
68 
59 
73 
60 
60 
Share of 
Loan Portfolio 
Owed by 
Operators 
With Debt-to-
Asset 
Ratios Over 100% 
14 
11 
35 
12 
14 
18 
26 
12 
12 
• Federal Land Banks, with 22 percent of operator debt, have 68 percent 
held by operators above the 40 percent line. About 11 percent of their 
debt is owed by insolvent farmers. 
• The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), holding 15 percent of the 
debt, has 84 percent concentrated in the hands of operators with debt-
to-asset ratios above 40 percent. More than 35 percent of the debt held 
by FmHA is owed by insolvent farmers. 
• For Production Credit Associations (PCAs), with 8 percent of the op-
erator debt, 58 percent is held by operators with debt-to-asset ratios 
above 40 percent. Just under 12 percent of their debt is owed by in-
solvent farmers. 
As loan losses have mounted, farm lenders, in their role as brokers of 
funds, have "socialized" the costs involved by maintaining interest rates 
for farm loans above normal equilibrium rates. This has been made pos-
sible by the diminished competition in rural areas among lenders as loan 
losses have risen. As a consequence, borrowers not in financial difficulty 
are paying a substantial part of the costs of those unable to pay principal 
and interest when due. 1 
A policy of no further intervention would have substantial negative ef-
fects. A March 1986 report of the U.S. General Accounting Office estimates 
that with no further intervention 21 percent of farm assets would have to 
be sold for restructuring purposes, 57 percent of the debt would have to 
be liquidated, 25 percent of farm operations would go out ofbusiness, and 
another 23 percent of the operators would need to sell some assets to 
remain in business. 2 About 7 percent of the debt would be written off. 
60 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1987 
Condition of the Farm Credit System 
By 1983, when outstanding farm debt totaled $216 billion, the Farm 
Credit System had become the dominant farm lender. The system held 
nearly 32 percent of total farm debt in 1983, with Federal Land Banks 
holding more than 43 percent of farm real estate debt. PCAs held almost 
23 percent of non-real estate debt before experiencing a decline in 1982 
(Amols and Kaiser, tables 1-3). By the end of 1985, these figures had 
decreased substantially. PCAs held 7.5 percent of non-real estate debt 
while the Federal Land Banks' share of real estate lending had declined to 
21 percent (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1986a, table 12). 3 At the same 
time. reserves of the Farm Credit System, including farmer-owned stock, 
had declined from $11.8 billion in 1984 (of which $6.2 billion was surplus) 
to $5.64 billion at the end of 1986, with system surplus totaling only $1.45 
billion on December 31, 1986 (Farm Credit System). 
With the weakening of the Farm Credit System, Congress responded 
with remedial legislation. The Farm Credit Amendments Act of 19854 was 
directed principally at reorganizing the Farm Credit Administration into 
the role of effective regulator, providing for the pooling of reserves within 
the Farm Credit System, and opening a line of credit at the U.S. Treasury. 
Under the legislation, the secretary of treasury is authorized to purchase 
Farm Credit System Capital Corporation obligations with funds appro-
priated for that purpose by Congress as a means of providing additional 
funds for the Farm Credit System when the system is unable, through its 
own resources and the Capital Corporation, to furnish adequate funds to 
provide credit for its borrowers. 5 Before the secretary of treasury may pur-
chase Capital Corporation obligations, the Farm Credit Administration 
must certify to the secretary of treasury and Congress that: ( 1) the Farm 
Credit System needs financial assistance, (2) the system has committed 
its available capital surplus and reserves, (3) salaries and benefits of senior 
officers of the system (except associations) are frozen for the earlier of five 
years or until the secretary no longer holds Capital Corporation securities, 
and (4) the system has used its capital to the extent that further contri-
butions from or losses by the system would preclude its institutions from 
making credit available to eligible borrowers on reasonable terms. 6 
In terms of stabilizing agriculture, the legislation was believed by its 
backers at the time of enactment to be sufficient to keep the Farm Credit 
System afloat but afforded little hope of significant trickle-down benefits 
to borrowers. Had the act been generous enough to benefit borrowers 
directly. it would have created serious problems of whipsawing agricultural 
lending by providing benefits for one group of borrowers over another 
group similarly situated except for the identity of their lender. Such an 
outcome would, over time, be expected to shift agricultural lending into 
the hands of lenders with access to the program of intervention and away 
from lenders denied that access. 
Additional legislation enacted late in the 1986 congressional session 
provided authority for the Farm Credit System to spread loss~s over as 
much as 20 years. That was designed to give the sys~em ~ore t.Ime before 
federal assistance would be required. Under the legislatiOn, with the ap-
proval of the Farm Credit Administration, beginning July 1, 1986. an? 
running through December 31, 1988, the institutions of the Farm Credit 
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System may annually capitalize their losses in excess of 0.5 percent of 
loans outstanding and amortize the amount over a period not to exceed 
20 years. 7 In addition, through December 31, 1988, the banks of the Farm 
Credit System may spread the costs involved in refinancing high-interest 
noncallable obligations over a maximum of 20 years. 8 In the same legis-
lation, the required approval of the Farm Credit Administration of interest 
rates charged by the system was terminated. 9 
Possible Federal Intervention 
Continued massive losses in the Farm Credit System through the first 
quarter of 1987 and the strong likelihood of losses continuing at a high 
rate make additional federal intervention inevitable. Some time during 
1987, the system is expected to approach the end of capital reserves and 
reach the point of system instability. Assistance before the end of 1987 
will be needed if system failure is to be avoided. Joint and several liability 
for obligations of the system, which have been issued on a consolidated 
systemwide basis, has ensured that the system would respond in support 
of weaker districts. 10 However, a 1987 U.S. District Court decision has 
held invalid regulations requiring stronger districts to respond with fi-
nancial contributions to weaker districts. I I 
Need for Structural Change 
Assistance rendered to the Farm Credit System should be accompanied 
by organizational and structural changes that address the fundamental 
reasons for vulnerability of the system. Unless inherent system vulnera-
,bUlty is addressed, problems of system instability will recur. 
.; Concern about system vulnerability is not new. A 1952 report prepared 
.by a committee chaired by a former governor of the Farm Credit Admin-
lspoatton focused on the problem of PCAs sharing the risks of losses on 
large loans (Hill et al.). 12 The governor of the Farm Credit Administration, 
. who had appointed the committee, had tried unsuccessfully to win support 
.for changes to better enable the PCAs to weather economic adversity. In 
Jts report, the committee stated that 
aside from the Government revolving fund, the production credit 
· associations have no way of sharing risks nor recourse to any 
comparable assistance in times of stress. Under the present struc-
ture, e~ch production credit association stands alone with respect 
to the ns~s ?f ~ut~tanding loans; there is no way now of spreading 
an associatiOns nsks beyond the limits of its territory. Because 
of the possibility of conditions which may be beyond the control 
?fthe ~orrowers or the association arising in a particular territory, 
1t is evident that individual associations could find themselves in 
an ~dverse financial condition beyond their ability to cope with. (p. 11) 
In a letter to com~ittee member W. G. Murray, the governor, I. W. Dug-
§an, who by that time had left the Farm Credit Administration, stated, 
Your very nice letter brought forcibly to my mind the fact that I had 
. com.pletely failed in making any progress in developing a program for op-
etattng the risks among PCA's. In fact, I even failed to convince those in 
62 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1987 
the Production Credit System that they had any problems. Possibly, they 
will have to go through a wringing out process bfjore they realize the 
situation [emphasis added] .... "13 In 1966, the Federal Farm Credit Board 
approved risk-sharing plans in eight farm credit districts (Haag, p. 159). 
If the Farm Credit System is to survive in recognizable form with both 
a wholesaling and retailing function in farm credit, four problem areas 
should be addressed. Unless the system is reconfigured to reflect solutions 
to the four problems, financial difficulties will almost inevitably recur. 
Diversity of Loan Portfolio 
One of the most important reasons, if not the most important reason, 
for the financial difficulties encountered by the Farm Credit System in the 
1980s is lack of diversity in the system's loan portfolio. Except for loans 
to farmer cooperatives, the system lends principally for agricultural pur-
poses and takes as collateral principally agricultural property. Moreover, 
loans to farmer cooperatives add relatively little diversity inasmuch as the 
fortunes of farmer cooperatives tend to parallel the fortunes of their farmer 
members. Diversity can be achieved in various ways: 
Geographical Diversity 
Diversity based on geography has existed since the Farm Credit System 
was established 14 and is particularly important in terms of withstanding 
economic adversity related to weather, other natural disasters, and local-
ized price and income phenomena. In the 1980s, geographical diversity 
was initially helpful in enabling the system to withstand the effects of the 
general economic downturn, the epicenter of which was in the Upper Mid-
west (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1986b, appendix tables 8 and 12). 
As shown in table 3, the financial problems of borrowers have been most 
severe in the Corn Belt, Lake States, and Northern Plains. 
Horizontal Diversity 
Diversity could be achieved by lending to borrowers whose economic 
fortunes are unrelated to agriculture. Moving to such diversity would alter 
the basic nature of the Farm Credit System and would make the system 
virtually indistinguishable in mission from other large, diversified lenders. 
Utilizing a secondary market for agricultural loans would be another 
dimension of horizontal diversity. Under the assumption that investors in 
a secondary market are unlikely to shoulder losses very long before with-
drawing from the market, a question is raised, however, about the extent 
to which a secondary market can be counted upon to absorb losses when 
the agricultural sector is under severe financial pressure as at present. 
Clearly an effective secondary market would require government guaran-
tees, capital reserves, or both to ensure that investor losses were consistent 
with investor expectations. 
Vertical Diversity 
Diversity could be achieved by lending to greater segments of the input 
supplying and output processing components of the agricultural sector. 
Farm Credit System/HarZ 
Table 3.-Dis~bution of F~s and Debt by Debt-to-Asset Ratio for 
Regtons of the Untted States, January 1, 1986 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
41 70% 71-100% Over 100% 
Farms 
63 
Region Debt Farms Debt Farms Debt 
Northeast Percent 9.3 27.3 3.3 23.3 1.4 Lake States 9.1 19.1 35.2 7.3 37.8 6.4 Com Belt 15.6 18.9 35.7 5.6 37.1 5.1 Northern Plains 17.6 16.7 34.0 8.8 40.1 Appalachia 6.8 19.8 6.7 23.0 1.1 ' 25.6 1.5 Southeast 13.7 9.8 37.8 3.4 28.7 Delta States 2.6 15.3 7.7 29.0 3.0 Southern Plains 9.0 41.8 5.8 28.6 25.4 3.2 26.8 Mountain States 3.0 15.9 16.0 36.4 4.9 Pacific States 10.5 24.6 2.9 9.8 31.8 4.0 30.2 2.1 10.7 
United States 12.7 4.6 4.0 
~~::p~~~b~partment of Agriculture 1986b, appendix tables 8 and 12, pp. 41 and 44 . 
~~c~ d~ersi~ would be less valuable than horizontal diversity because of mov:~ ~~Zte~ ~~ rg~ent~ of input supply and output processing to 
th . F C . armmg m terms of economic health. To a degree 
fa:m ~t redit S~stem has a measure of vertical diversity with loans t~ favbrabl~ s~pplymg and output processing firms. The relatively more 
com dper ormance levels of the Banks for Cooperatives in the 1980 atte~a;: t:ei~~eede~a~_Lan~ Banks and ~ederal Intermediate Credit Bank! 
. . . o Iversity, even vertical diversity. 
Fu!lctional Diversity 
· Broadening the syste · 1· f 
tiQilal diversity D" .f s .me .o p~oducts beyond loans would add func-
oU;ter financial. se~~~Is I~ation mto ~nsurance, .real ~state, brokerage, and 
®.veloped by the Far C oul? provide such diversity. Long-range plans 
hi-ought a modicum::/ f red~t Syst~m e~rlier in.this decade would have 
whether there is ade unctwr;t~ di~ersity. A relevant question to ask is 
tlon of another large cg~a:e j~sltlficatlion for governmentally assisted crea-
. · ncia cong omerate. 
Time Diversity 
· Diversity ov t" 
economic tim:r I~e could be ~ch~eved by building capital reserves in good 
times of eco s _with the. realizatiOn that the reserves will be utilized in 
option used~~rr;~c adv~rsity ~or borrowers. This is essentially the diversity 
f~erv~.t-o enablee t6's emtt rough th~ mid-1980s, but without sufficient 
e sys em to survive the. unusually severe downturn. 
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Accordingly, the system was obliged to arrange for external assistance from 
the federal government in late 1985. 15 . 
If time diversity is once again relied upon in the decades followmg the 
1980s, a greater premium will need to be exacted from borrowers in ~ood 
economic times than was exacted in the period before the 1980s. This of 
course creates a competitive disadvantage compared with lenders able to 
achieve diversity of loan portfolio other than on a time basis. A mandatory 
lender indemnity program funded by all agricultural borrowers would re-
solve the problem of competitive effect. If not imposed on all lenders, the 
question is whether the unique features of the Farm Credit System, notably 
agency status, provide a sufficiently large ~dvanta~e. to offset .the compet-
itive disadvantage inherent in accumulatmg additiOnal capital reserves 
during favorable economic times. 
Protection for Bonds 
With most lenders highly leveraged, the onset of economic or fina~cial 
adversity means that those supplying fu_nds to .troubled len~ers.are hk~ly 
to become increasingly reluctant to provide capital on a contmumg basis. 
For commercial banks, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pro-
tection for depositors acts to ease depositor concerns and prevent "runs" 
on banks that were common before enactment of legislation creating the 
FDIC in 1933. 16 
For the Farm Credit System, agency status (Haag, chap. 6) has enabled 
the system to weather minor crises and obtain funds near the cost of U.~. 
Treasury borrowing 17 but was ineffective in allaying investor concern~ m 
late 1985 before enactment of legislation ensuring a procedure for seekmg 
direct federal assistance if needed. 18 The cost of system borrowing soared 
to some 150 basis points above U.S. Treasury borrowings in contrast to 
the usual 8 to 10 point spread. 
If the Farm Credit System is to survive with funds obtained in the money 
markets, attention should be given to providing protection for bondhold-
ers. Consideration should be given to creating FDIC-type coverage f?r the 
system in any package of measures for restructuring the Farm Credit Sys-
tem for survival. The experience of the 1980s has demonstrated conclu-
sively that a plan of accumulating reserve funds throughout the system 
but with later levy on those reserves held by the stronger banks to. assist 
those who are less strong is a certain prescription for strong dissent. 
Accumulating funds under an FDIC-type arrangement, perhap~ ~s a small 
proportion of funds obtained through the placement of secuntles by the 
fiscal agency, would seem to be a superior solution. The role of an FDIC-
type fund for the Farm Credit System, as with the role ~f th~ ~DIC:, would 
be to provide protection to the financial system by mamtammg mves~or 
losses within the range of investor expectations rather than to provide 
protection for the contributors of equity capital. 
Adequacy of Capital 
It is axiomatic that any lender needs an adequate capital base to with-
stand loan losses. The Farm Credit System has functioned with an unusual 
capital arrangement. Borrowers from the Farm Credit System have been 
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required to purchase stock in the system equal to 5 or 10 percent of the 
loan. The borrower thus received 90 to 95 percent of the loan with the 
other 5 to 10 percent retained as stock in the system. By contrast, the 
Banks for Cooperatives have functioned with real money capital, adjusted 
each year with cash paid into the bank by borrowers to maintain the 
required stock base. 
Plans for a reconfigured Farm Credit System must give attention to a 
capital base adequate for the risks and economic shocks likely to be in-
flicted upon the system. A system of capital generated by farmer loans is 
simply too fragile to endure in times of extreme economic adversity. 
One possibility, of course, is to downplay the importance of a capital 
base with loan losses absorbed through higher interest rates or lower levels 
of net worth (or greater levels of negative net worth) in periods of adversity. 
A disciplined approach to lending and financial institution management 
would suggest that a system based on capital at risk by decision makers 
is superior to a system where the shocks of adversity are transmitted 
directly to taxpayers generally. 
Monitoring of Borrower Condition 
A major reason why the Farm Credit System was blindsided by the eco-
nomic problems of the 1980s was lack of awareness of the economic dif-
ficulties faced by its borrowers. This was particularly true of the Federal 
Land Banks. Relatively little attention was given to the changing economic 
condition of its member-borrowers. Thus the system was both unprepared 
and. unbelieving when adversity surfaced in the 1980s. 
Fundamental as it may seem, an important part of effective loan man-
agement is monitoring the changing economic condition of borrowers. 
The system should be far more aggressive in maintaining that level of 
surveillance and more responsive in developing strategies to deal with 
borrower travail. In the economic downturn of the 1980s, the Farm Credit 
System initially gained the dubious distinction of being the least respon-
. stve of major lenders in terms of willingness to restructure loans. 
Intervention Alternatives 
' :T1te roots of member-borrower control of the Farm Credit System run 
:~p. The Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 provided for member-borrower 
control of local National Farm Loan Associations and the election of mem-
l?ets of boards of directors of the Federal Land Banks by the representatives 
of the farmers-local boards of directors. 19 The concept of farmer control 
. continued through subsequent legislation, including the Farm Credit Act 
of 1971.2° Control of the Farm Credit System is in the hands of its member-
bOrrowers-farmers and ranchers. Member-borrowers elect local boards of 
• directors to make policies for their cooperative and to choose and guide 
management and monitor its effectiveness. The local directors selected by 
member-borrowers also act as their representatives in choosing directors 
f9r the district Farm Credit banks. 
· Member-borrower control is not viewed as a major reason for system 
difficulties in the 1980s. Moreover, member-borrower control is not viewed 
:·as ihconsistent with professional-style management at the various levels. 
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As a nontrivial aggregation of capital, the Farm Credit System must be 
managed with a high level of skill if the system is to survive. 
Basic Choices 
The condition of the Farm Credit System, the magnitude of the system, 
the relationship of units within the system, and the nature of the objectives 
being served suggest three basic choices in terms of remedial action: 
( 1) preservation of the system in recognizable form, (2) decentralization of 
the system to the district level, or (3) a shift toward a wholesaling function 
for the Farm Credit System. A fourth alternative, centralization to a single 
decision-making unit, seems unattainable politically and practically. 
System Preservation 
Preservation of the system would be the most likely to meet the expec-
tations of system borrowers and also would be the most likely to protect 
borrower stock in the system in the near term. Preservation of the system 
would ensure a competitive presence in agricultural lending and could be 
carried out in a manner that would strengthen borrower control. To pre-
serve the Farm Credit System in recognizable form, massive infusions of 
capital or loan guarantees by the federal government would be required. 
The cost, in the face of continuing borrower instability, is expected to total 
$8 to $10 billion. 
A policy issue of critical importance is whether expe~ditures to p~eserve 
the Farm Credit System would be the best use of pubhc funds. In hght of 
( 1) excess lending capacity in agriculture under current conditions, (2) the 
likelihood of further substantial reductions in agricultural loans, (3) the 
weakened condition of the Farm Credit System, and (4) the central im-
portance of borrower stability to sectoral stability, a question is raised as 
to other possible strategies for public intervention. 
Decentralization of the System 
Another alternative would be to decentralize the system to the district 
level with each district expected, at least in the long run, to maintain 
viability. Such a move would address the concerns held by some districts 
that assistance to weaker banks threatens their economic future. However, 
a district-level system would mean even less geographical diversity than at 
present. . .. 
To effect decentralization, it would be necessary to provide sufficient 
funding or guarantees to ensure that holders of s~s.tem bonds were ~ot 
jeopardized. Joint and several liability would be m~difled a~ to new secunty 
issues. Some districts would require external assistance m the near term 
or the banks in those districts would be in danger of failing. Mergers of 
banks and of districts would be one possible outcome, with banks per-
mitted to operate beyond district boundaries. With this approach, each 
district would be left to wrestle with market forces and develop an appro-
priate strategy for survival and eventual rebuilding of capital. 
--- --------------- ---------------~-
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A Wholesaling Function 
. As a third alternative, the Farm Credit System could be restructured 
thto a wholesaler of credit with gradual disappearance of the retail func-
tion. The most valuable features of the system would be retained with loan 
guarantees used where necessary to move loans into the hands of other 
lenders. 
Preserving the Unique Features of the System 
Clearly the Farm Credit System possesses two unique and highly valuable 
features: ( 1) a long-term land lending capability21 and (2) a highly efficient 
thechanism for obtaining funds in the central money markets. A convinc-
thg argument could be made for a transition of the Farm Credit System 
toward: ( 1) a central land bank serving the entire country, (2) a central 
bank for cooperatives, and ( 3) a wholesaling function for other credit needs, 
With funds for production credit and land loans channeled through com-
mercial banks. With this approach, the system would recede from retail 
1fnding operations, with outstanding loans moved into the hands of com-
Itlercial banks and federal loan guarantees where necessary to make the 
· loans marketable. 
_ Serving a function of wholesaling credit is not a new experience for the 
Farm Credit System. When Congress established the Federal Intermediate 
eredit Banks in 1923, it provided that these banks could discount farmers' 
~otes financed by agricultural credit corporations, livestock loan compa-
$es. and commercial banks as well as make loans to cooperatives on ware-
house receipts. 22 
· , In the Farm Credit Act of 1971,23 Congress gave PCAs the authority to 
Participate with local commercial banks in their larger farm and range 
~. The commercial bank/Farm Credit System participation loan pro-
gt:am is similar to an overline arrangement between a commercial bank 
~one of its regional correspondent banks. An agreement is signed spec-
ify!lng terms for the PCA to purchase a portion of larger agricultural loans 
~Ill the commercial banks, normally representing amounts in excess of 
_ ~~~ing limits for individual borrowers. The primary lender continues its 
w.te. servicing the complete line of credit. 
; Since the Agricultural Credits Act of 1923,24 the Farm Credit System 
.$:had authority to provide funds to commercial banks and other finan-
~institutions. To qualify for discounting privileges, an institution must 
fthOW that: ( 1 l it is primarily engaged in the business of extending short-
~intermediate-term credit to farmers, ranchers, and/or producers or 
blu"vl!sters of aquatic products; (2) at least 15 percent of its total loan 
~ume is in agricultural loans at the seasonal peak; (3) it has had a gross loan~to-deposit ratio of at least 60 percent at the seasonal peak for the last 
three consecutive years; (4) it has limited access to national or regional 
money markets as an alternative source of funds and is fully utilizing locally 
generated funds to finance local needs; and (5) it would continue to use 
a.t least the same proportion of its resources for agricultural or aquatic 
~nding. 25 
. A transition to a wholesaling function for the Farm Credit System would 
less competition in agricultural lending and greater difficulty in 
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ensuring borrower control. Limitations on access of funds could be im-
plemented by the system as a wholesaler of funds. Borrower control would 
be effected principally by controlling the conditions of access to funding 
from the Farm Credit System. One realistic approach to restructuring the 
system would involve a combination of approaches as discussed in the 
next section. 
An Integrated Approach to Restructuring the Farm 
Credit System26 
The rapidly deteriorating condition of the Farm Credit System ensures 
that assistance will be needed in 1987 if the system is to avoid financial 
instability. The amount, type, and timing of assistance are all critical vari-
ables in terms of the influence on long-term configuration of the system 
and the extent to which the problems of heavily stressed farm borrowers 
are addressed. To the extent that assistance is funded from amounts di-
verted from price and income support programs, an additional segment 
of borrowers is placed at risk as farm incomes decline, thus creating the 
need for targeted programs of intervention for borrowers. Various patterns 
are possible and feasible for providing assistance to the Farm Credit Sys-
tem. This paper discusses one set of alternatives as outlined in figure 1. 
Secondary Market 
The concept of a secondary market for mortgage-backed farm real estate 
loans would provide a number of important advantages in connecting pri-
mary mortgage lenders with final investors. Eventually a secondary market 
could embrace properly backed non-real estate loans as well. It is antici-
pated that originating lenders would retain at least a significant interest 
in the loan and would continue to service the loan account. It is envisioned 
that the secondary market would be operated within the Farm Credit Sys-
tem to take advantage of the system's agency status, perhaps as a subsid-
iary of that organization. The market would be accessible by units of the 
Farm Credit System, commercial banks, insurance companies, and other 
regulated farm lenders. 
The greatest concern about the secondary market is in handling loan 
losses. While the strong collateral requirements for loans (with loans lim-
ited to 50 to 60 percent of collateral value) and the retained ownership of 
the loan by the originating lender would provide substantial assurance 
that investors would not suffer losses, it is almost certain that losses in 
periods of cyclic downturns in agriculture (similar to the 1930s and 1980s) 
would exceed margins. For that reason, a reserve fund should be main-
tained as a credit enhancer. Initially the reserve fund could be secured by 
an explicit government guarantee, which would be phased out as capital 
reserves are accumulated, based on a modest percentage of the value of 
loans sold in the secondary market. 
To ensure responsiveness of secondary market operations to the needs 
of agriculture for a dependable source of credit at reasonable cost, it would 
be important to have farmer involvement in the control of the secondary 
market operation. A secondary market could fit with any configuration of 
a restructured Farm Credit System. 
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Decentralization of the Farm Credit System 
The experience of the 1980s, as the Farm Credit System was over-
whelmed with a deteriorating loan portfolio, has been that stronger dis-
tricts respond in support of districts weakened by loan losses only grudgingly 
and with substantial resistance. Stronger districts have mounted legal 
challenges to the pooling of capital systemwide. It seems unwise to con-
tinue such a procedure for responding to adversity. 
One feasible approach would be to decentralize the system with greater 
autonomy at the level of district banks. Each district bank would be viewed 
as a profit-and-loss and control center and would be free to expand business 
operations outside present district boundaries. Each district bank would 
be expected to rebuild and maintain an adequate capital base for bank 
operations. 
To implement a decentralized approach, it would be necessary to modify 
joint and several liability for consolidated systemwide bonds and notes. In 
addition, ongoing assurances would be needed to ensure that investors in 
bonds and notes would be paid interest and principal on schedule. To 
handle both functions, it is envisioned that an FDIC-type fund would be 
created to provide such assurance. The fund would respond after district 
bank capital had been reduced to specified minimum levels. Initially the 
fund would be backed by government guarantees that would be phased 
out as reserve amounts (based on a percentage of loans made by district 
banks) reached an adequate level. 
Assistance with Troubled Loans 
For weaker district banks to have a reasonable opportunity to rebuild 
capital and to ensure farm borrowers an opportunity to become financially 
and economically stable, assistance in some form will be needed: ( 1) to 
lenders in restructuring farm loans or (2) to borrowers in servicing loan 
obligations. Indications are that the cost would be approximately the same 
in either case. 
Three alternatives for providing the assistance seem feasible: ( 1) provide 
sufficient funding to the Capital Corporation such that troubled loans 
could be purchased from district banks and other farm lenders, (2) provide 
an infusion of limited amounts of capital from the U.S. Treasury directly 
to district banks as needed, or (3) implement a targeted interest buy-down 
program for borrowers with several times more funding than provided in 
the Food Security Act of 1985. The objective of the latter type of program 
would be to reduce the interest rate for borrowers with good management 
skills to approximately the rate of return on farm assets (Harl 1986a, 1986c). 
Any intervention effort, whether available to lenders or borrowers, must 
at some point provide for determinations of which farm operations are to 
be liquidated, which farm operations are to be restructured, and which 
farm operations are to be ineligible for intervention benefits. In all in-
stances, an "upside" eligibility test is necessary to identify operations that 
are capable of being or becoming economically stable without intervention 
assistance and a "downsize" eligibility test to identify operations incapable 
of becoming economically stable even with intervention assistance (Harl 
1986a, 1986c). 
Farm Credit System!Harl 
Expanded OFI Window 
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To ensure adequate credit in all areas on a dependable basis at reasonable 
cost, it seems highly advisable to provide for unimpeded access to the 
"Other Financial Institutions" (OFI) window of the Farm Credit System. 
In all instances, commercial banks would be assured access to loanable 
funds as needed through issuance of Farm Credit System bonds and notes. 
competition among lenders in rural areas should be enhanced as a result. 
In areas where district banks were unable to rebuild capital and maintain 
a viable presence in agricultural lending, the Farm Credit System would 
become essentially a wholesaler of credit with both production credit and 
land loans made by commercial banks in accordance with regulations gov-
erning lenders acquiring funds through the Farm Credit System. 
Long-Term Objectives 
The policy considerations of paramount importance relate to the features 
of the agricultural lending system that will provide the sector with a de-
pendable and stable source of reasonably priced credit over the next several 
decades. Certainly the institutional instability currently in evidence poses 
an opportunity to recast agricultural lending in a mold to better fit the 
realities of the next century. With very rapid growth in agricultural pro-
ductivity occuring in recent years outside the United States, and with 
further growth in prospect, agricultural lending in the United States will 
likely go through a downsizing process over the next several years. With a 
dear prospect of substantial excess capacity in agricultural lending, the 
restructuring of the Farm Credit System should be carried out in a manner 
consistent with the realities of credit needs for agriculture. 
Notes 
1. Some commentators focusing only on the macro side of the farm debt crisis 
seem to have ignored this response by those suffering losses. See Gabriel and 
Prentice. 
2. More recent data indicate these figures may be low. See Jolly, Doye. and Choat. 
3. Preliminary figures for the end of 1986 show Federal Land Bank loans drop-
ping to 18 percent of real estate loans outstanding. 
4. Pub. L. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678 (1985). 
5. 12 U.S.C. § 2216(j). added by Pub. L. 99-205, Sec. 103, 99 Stat. 1686 (1985). 
6. Id., § 2216(i)(a). 
7. Farm Credit Act Amendments of 1986, Sec. 1037, amending 12 U.S.C. § 2254 (b). 
8. ld., Sec. 1034, amending 12 U.S.C. § 2259. 
9. ld., Sec. 1033, amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 2015, 2075, 2131(a). 
10. See 12 C.F.R. § 615.5100 (1986). 
11. Federal Land Bank of Springfield v. Farm Credit Administration, Civ. 86-
0214, --F. Supp. __ (D. Mass. 1987). 
12. The committee consisted of F. F. Hill, chair; G. H. Aull; E. L. Butz; A. R. 
Gaus; W. G. Murray; and R. J. Saulnier. 
13. Letter dated July 22, 1953, from I. W. Duggan to William G. Murray (copy 
in author's files). 
14. There is some evidence that the original 12 land bank districts were estab-
lished to avoid "one-crop" districts (Hoag, p. 215; Wright, pp. 80-81). 
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15. See note 4 supra. 
16. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933). 
17. Among earlier crises was the insolvency of the Spokane Federal Land Bank 
in 1925, with assistance provided by the other federal land banks (Sparks, p. 135). 
Several joint-stock land banks also failed (Sparks, pp. 163-64). 
18. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
19. Pub. L. 64-158, 39 Stat. 360, 362-63 (1916) (For Federal Land Banks. six 
of nine directors must be local directors "chosen by and ... representative of 
national farm loan associations."). 
20. Pub. L. 92-181. 85 Stat. 583 et seq. (1971). 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2259 ("Each 
Federal Land Bank association shall elect from its voting shareholders a board of 
directors ... as may be required by its bylaws."). 
21. The Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, Pub. L. 64-158, 39 Stat. 360 (1916), 
provided for two types ofbanks: (1) the cooperative Federal Land Banks and (2) 
individual joint-stock land banks organized by private individuals for profit. The 
stated purposes to be served were "to provide capital for agricultural development, 
to create standard forms of investment based upon farm mortgages, [and] to equal-
ize rates of interest upon farm loans .... "Pub. L. 64-158, 39 Stat. 360, Ch. 245 
(1916). 
22. Agricultural Credits Act of 1923, Pub. L. 67-503, 42 Stat. 1454 (1923). 
23. Pub. L. 92-181, 85 Stat. 583 (1971). 
24. Pub. L. 67-503, Sec. 1. 42 Stat. 1454 (1923). 
25. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4550(a) (1986). 
26. This section is drawn from testimony presented on March 26, 1987, to the 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Subcommittee on Agricultural 
Credit, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. Helpful comments from members of the 
Farm Credit Task Force, National Pork Producers' Council, are gratefully acknowl-
edged. 
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